split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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@@ -980,23 +980,8 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
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* @file: unused
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* @reqprot: unused
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* @prot: unused
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* @flags: unused
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* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
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* @addr_only: unused
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*
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* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
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* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
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* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
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* -EPERM if not.
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*/
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int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
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unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
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int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
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{
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return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
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return 0;
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}
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