arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs
commit 0dfefc2ea2f29ced2416017d7e5b1253a54c2735 upstream. A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence what the hardware speculates will happen next. On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence. This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by seccomp. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
73591041a5
commit
42a20cf510
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
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enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
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bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
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extern bool __nospectre_bhb;
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u8 get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(void);
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bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated(void);
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void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
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@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
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isb();
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}
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static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
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bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
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static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
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{
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__nospectre_bhb = true;
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "bpf_jit: " fmt
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#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
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#include <linux/bitfield.h>
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
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#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
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#include <asm/byteorder.h>
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#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
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#include <asm/insn.h>
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#include <asm/patching.h>
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@@ -653,7 +655,48 @@ static void build_plt(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
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plt->target = (u64)&dummy_tramp;
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}
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static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
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/* Clobbers BPF registers 1-4, aka x0-x3 */
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static void __maybe_unused build_bhb_mitigation(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
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{
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const u8 r1 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_1]; /* aka x0 */
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u8 k = get_spectre_bhb_loop_value();
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY) ||
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cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb ||
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arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
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return;
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if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
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emit(aarch64_insn_gen_hint(AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CLEARBHB), ctx);
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return;
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}
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if (k) {
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emit_a64_mov_i64(r1, k, ctx);
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emit(A64_B(1), ctx);
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emit(A64_SUBS_I(true, r1, r1, 1), ctx);
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emit(A64_B_(A64_COND_NE, -2), ctx);
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emit(aarch64_insn_gen_dsb(AARCH64_INSN_MB_ISH), ctx);
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emit(aarch64_insn_get_isb_value(), ctx);
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}
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if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated()) {
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emit(A64_ORR_I(false, r1, AARCH64_INSN_REG_ZR,
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ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3), ctx);
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switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
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case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
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emit(aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(), ctx);
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break;
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case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
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emit(aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(), ctx);
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break;
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default:
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pr_err_once("Firmware mitigation enabled with unknown conduit\n");
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}
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}
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}
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static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool was_classic)
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{
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const u8 r0 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_0];
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const u8 r6 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_6];
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@@ -675,10 +718,13 @@ static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
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emit(A64_POP(r8, r9, A64_SP), ctx);
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emit(A64_POP(r6, r7, A64_SP), ctx);
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if (was_classic)
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build_bhb_mitigation(ctx);
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/* Restore FP/LR registers */
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emit(A64_POP(A64_FP, A64_LR, A64_SP), ctx);
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/* Set return value */
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/* Move the return value from bpf:r0 (aka x7) to x0 */
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emit(A64_MOV(1, A64_R(0), r0), ctx);
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/* Authenticate lr */
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@@ -1586,7 +1632,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
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}
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ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
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build_epilogue(&ctx);
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build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
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build_plt(&ctx);
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extable_align = __alignof__(struct exception_table_entry);
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@@ -1622,7 +1668,7 @@ skip_init_ctx:
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goto out_off;
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}
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build_epilogue(&ctx);
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build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
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build_plt(&ctx);
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/* 3. Extra pass to validate JITed code. */
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