x86/bugs: Rename MDS machinery to something more generic

Commit f9af88a3d384c8b55beb5dc5483e5da0135fadbd upstream.

It will be used by other x86 mitigations.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst

@@ -157,9 +157,7 @@ This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
 combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
 buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
 
-Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
-
-	mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+Kernel does the buffer clearing with x86_clear_cpu_buffers().
 
 On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
 kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No

Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ enters a C-state.
 
 The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
 
-    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+    x86_clear_cpu_buffers()
 
 Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
 Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
@@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ Mitigation points
    idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
    activated.
 
-   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
-   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
-   the system.
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key cpu_buf_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of the
+   system.
 
    The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
    that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread

arch/x86/entry/entry.S

@@ -31,20 +31,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
 
 /*
  * Define the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that
- * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensure VERW can be
+ * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensures VERW can be
  * used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched.
  */
 .pushsection .entry.text, "ax"
 
 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel)
+SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(x86_verw_sel)
 	UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	.word __KERNEL_DS
 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel);
+SYM_CODE_END(x86_verw_sel);
 /* For KVM */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_verw_sel);
 
 .popsection
 

arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h

@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ static __always_inline void native_irq_enable(void)
 
 static __always_inline void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static __always_inline void native_halt(void)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 

arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static __always_inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, unsigned long ecx,
 
 static __always_inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ static __always_inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 
 static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -324,22 +324,22 @@
 .endm
 
 /*
- * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
- * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
- * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
- *
+ * Macro to execute VERW insns that mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS or TSA. On affected systems a microcode update
+ * overloaded VERW insns to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers
+ * CFLAGS.ZF.
  * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
  */
 .macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw mds_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
 #else
 	/*
 	 * In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data
 	 * segments may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not
 	 * be flat (ESPFIX32).
 	 */
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:mds_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
 #endif
 .endm
 
@@ -592,24 +592,24 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
-extern u16 mds_verw_sel;
+extern u16 x86_verw_sel;
 
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
+ * x86_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support for different x86 CPU vulns
  *
  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
  * instruction is executed.
  */
-static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
 	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
 
@@ -626,14 +626,15 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS
+ * vulnerability
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */
-static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_buf_idle_clear))
+		x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Control CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 /*
  * Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * is required irrespective of SMT state.
 	 */
 	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if the system has the right microcode.
@@ -2082,10 +2082,10 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 		return;
 
 	if (sched_smt_active()) {
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 	} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
 		   (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
-		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 	}
 }
 

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

@@ -7263,7 +7263,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
 	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+		x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);