docs: record verified native preview and unfinished PWA parity

Replace current wrapper claims with native architecture/security/build evidence, preserve historical documents, track all thirty pages and explicit release gates, correct brand attribution and provide the twelve-section delivery report without claiming completion. Native signing remains paused and Apple application/device validation outstanding.

docs/security-review.md

@@ -1,47 +1,36 @@
-# Security review record
+# Native security review record
 
-This is an engineering review, not an independent penetration test or certification.
+This is an engineering checklist, not an independent audit or release approval.
+The wrapper review is retained separately as
+[historical evidence](legacy-wrapper-security-review.md).
 
-Addressed during implementation:
+## Implemented controls to exercise
 
-- Canonical, HTTPS-only origin/port comparison; credential, fragment, query,
-  subpath, scheme, lookalike-host and TLS-downgrade regression cases.
-- A main-frame POST can bypass Android's usual navigation callback. The request
-  interception gate now rejects **all** cross-origin requests, not only subresources.
-  The emulator regression was observed failing when the main-frame guard was
-  deliberately removed, then rerun with the fix restored.
-- TLS failures cancel by default. Native download redirects are refused before
-  cookies can be replayed to another origin. Bootstrap requests use neither
-  cookies nor automatic redirects and have bounded metadata reads/timeouts.
-- Files use explicit system selection/content URIs; no filesystem or storage
-  permission is granted to web content. Blob exports have no native JS bridge.
-- Complete Android browsing-data deletion uses WebStorageCompat, with OS app
-  reset for engines without that capability. WebStorage.deleteAllData alone was
-  insufficient for service-worker CacheStorage/IndexedDB and is not relied upon.
-- iOS server erase replaces the WKWebView, not only its URL, eliminating old
-  history/back-forward contexts as well as persistent website data.
-- iOS metadata uses typed decoding, rejecting numeric values masquerading as booleans.
-- Native picker results are bound to the browsing generation/request. Android
-  rejects stale upload/download selections, revokes camera URI grants, and clears
-  capture cache on erasure. iOS ignores export-cancellation callbacks from an old
-  download. Apple-specific callback regressions have not run without Xcode.
-- KGP was upgraded after OSV identified CVE-2026-53914 in the original build tool.
-  The final OSV scan found no listed advisories across 213 locked/direct Maven
-  coordinates and build plugins. Rescan after resolution/lock updates.
-- The inspected release APK is not debuggable, rejects cleartext, disables backup
-  and trusts system CAs only. AndroidX's exported profile installer receiver is
-  protected by the system DUMP permission; app providers are not exported.
+- Origin-bound HTTPS API transports, no redirects, no production test-CA bypass.
+- Server-owned session and CSRF semantics, no persistent password storage.
+- Origin-bound AES-GCM/AndroidKeyStore cookies; iOS Keychain protected
+  WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly with a private ephemeral URLSession jar.
+- Bounded JSON reads, deadlines and no offline/ambiguous-write retry queue.
+- Native permission-aware controls, destructive-action confirmation and server
+  validation; partial update payloads preserve fields the native editor cannot edit.
+- No WebView/WKWebView in either shipping source tree. Legacy tests do not prove
+  this client's behavior; explicit native tests and source invariants are required.
 
-Release gates still requiring evidence:
+## Remaining gates
 
-- Actual Xcode typecheck, simulator, archive, physical-device and accessibility review.
-- End-to-end IdP flows, especially providers that prohibit embedded agents; no
-  browser-to-native session transfer is supported by the current upstream protocol.
-- iOS unknown-length download disk-pressure behavior; a post-download size check
-  is not a streaming quota. Verify file picker/camera cancellation on real devices.
-- Android file-picker/camera/rotation while a picker is outstanding; cancellation
-  on process death intentionally loses the selection, never silently retries it.
-- Offline sign-out/account switching, stale-worker updates and server erasure on
-  current WebView/WKWebView versions. Upstream tests are not native device proof.
-- Reverify final signed release manifests, signing, store ownership, private vulnerability contact
-  and applicable privacy disclosures. No claim that all vulnerabilities are absent.
+1. Run Apple SDK typechecking, simulator/XCTest/UI and device checks; portable
+   Foundation transport compilation is not SwiftUI/Security.framework validation.
+2. Review persistent-cookie expiry/removal, TLS failures, redirects, CSRF refresh,
+   expired sessions, background/recreation and stale-response isolation on devices.
+3. Review migrations from the prototype: browser sessions are never imported and
+   OS website data may remain until app-data reset/reinstall.
+4. Complete missing auth/provider protocols and permission/role scenarios before
+   claiming native authentication parity, particularly SSO-only deployments.
+5. Implement/review files, notifications, offline storage and additional modules
+   as actual native capabilities; do not restore the wrapper as a shortcut.
+6. Independently review the new UI/state/transport code, actual signed artifacts,
+   accessibility, supported OS matrix and runner trust before distribution.
+
+The owner-authorized signing configuration exists privately but its workflow
+changes are intentionally parked. A signed incomplete client is not a completed
+native product. Refer to [native parity](native-parity.md) before release work.