[NX-204 Issue] Add secret management guidelines and enhance security notes

Introduced a comprehensive guide for secure production secret handling (`docs/security/secret-management.md`). Updated `.env.example` files with clearer comments on best practices, emphasizing not hardcoding secrets and implementing rotation strategies. Enhanced README with a new section linking to the secret management documentation.

.env.example

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ LOG_LEVEL=INFO
 # Core Database (internal metadata DB)
 # ------------------------------
 # Database that stores users, targets, metrics, query stats, and audit logs.
+# DEV default only. Use strong unique credentials in production.
 DB_NAME=nexapg
 DB_USER=nexapg
 DB_PASSWORD=nexapg
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ DB_PORT=5433
 # ------------------------------
 # Host port mapped to backend container port 8000.
 BACKEND_PORT=8000
-# JWT signing secret. Change this in every non-local environment.
+# JWT signing secret. Never hardcode in source. Rotate regularly.
 JWT_SECRET_KEY=change_this_super_secret
 JWT_ALGORITHM=HS256
 # Access token lifetime in minutes.
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_MINUTES=15
 # Refresh token lifetime in minutes (10080 = 7 days).
 JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_MINUTES=10080
 # Key used to encrypt monitored target passwords at rest.
+# Never hardcode in source. Rotate with re-encryption plan.
 # Generate with:
 # python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
 ENCRYPTION_KEY=REPLACE_WITH_FERNET_KEY
@@ -56,5 +58,5 @@ INIT_ADMIN_PASSWORD=ChangeMe123!
 # ------------------------------
 # Frontend
 # ------------------------------
-# Host port mapped to frontend container port 80.
+# Host port mapped to frontend container port 8080.
 FRONTEND_PORT=5173

.github/workflows/docker-release.yml

@@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.13"
+
+      - name: Dependency security gate (pip-audit)
+        run: |
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          pip install pip-audit
+          pip-audit -r backend/requirements.txt --format json --aliases --output pip-audit-backend.json || true
+          python backend/scripts/pip_audit_gate.py \
+            --report pip-audit-backend.json \
+            --allowlist ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json
+
       - name: Resolve version/tag
         id: ver
         shell: bash
@@ -51,10 +65,28 @@ jobs:
           if [ -z "$NS" ]; then
             NS="${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}"
           fi
-          if [ -z "$NS" ]; then
+          
+          # Normalize accidental input like spaces or uppercase.
+          NS="$(echo "$NS" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' | xargs)"
+          
+          # Reject clearly invalid placeholders/config mistakes early.
+          if [ -z "$NS" ] || [ "$NS" = "-" ]; then
             echo "Missing Docker Hub namespace. Set repo var DOCKERHUB_NAMESPACE or secret DOCKERHUB_USERNAME."
             exit 1
           fi
+          
+          # Namespace must be a single Docker Hub account/org name, not a path/url.
+          if [[ "$NS" == *"/"* ]] || [[ "$NS" == *":"* ]]; then
+            echo "Invalid Docker Hub namespace '$NS'. Use only the account/org name (e.g. 'nesterovicit')."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          
+          if ! [[ "$NS" =~ ^[a-z0-9]+([._-][a-z0-9]+)*$ ]]; then
+            echo "Invalid Docker Hub namespace '$NS'. Allowed: lowercase letters, digits, ., _, -"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          
+          echo "Using Docker Hub namespace: $NS"
           echo "value=$NS" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx

.github/workflows/proxy-profile-validation.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+name: Proxy Profile Validation
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["main", "master", "development"]
+    paths:
+      - "frontend/**"
+      - "ops/profiles/prod/**"
+      - "ops/scripts/validate_proxy_profile.sh"
+      - ".github/workflows/proxy-profile-validation.yml"
+      - "README.md"
+      - ".env.example"
+      - "ops/.env.example"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "frontend/**"
+      - "ops/profiles/prod/**"
+      - "ops/scripts/validate_proxy_profile.sh"
+      - ".github/workflows/proxy-profile-validation.yml"
+      - "README.md"
+      - ".env.example"
+      - "ops/.env.example"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  validate:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 1
+
+      - name: Validate proxy profile and mixed-content guardrails
+        run: bash ops/scripts/validate_proxy_profile.sh

.github/workflows/python-dependency-security.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+name: Python Dependency Security
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["main", "master", "development"]
+    paths:
+      - "backend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/python-dependency-security.yml"
+      - "ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json"
+      - "docs/security/dependency-exceptions.md"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "backend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/python-dependency-security.yml"
+      - "ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json"
+      - "docs/security/dependency-exceptions.md"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  pip-audit:
+    name: pip-audit (block high/critical)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 1
+
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.13"
+
+      - name: Install pip-audit
+        run: |
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          pip install pip-audit
+
+      - name: Run pip-audit (JSON report)
+        run: |
+          pip-audit -r backend/requirements.txt --format json --aliases --output pip-audit-backend.json || true
+
+      - name: Enforce vulnerability policy
+        run: |
+          python backend/scripts/pip_audit_gate.py \
+            --report pip-audit-backend.json \
+            --allowlist ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json
+
+      - name: Upload pip-audit report
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+        with:
+          name: pip-audit-security-report
+          path: pip-audit-backend.json

README.md

@@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ It combines FastAPI, React, and PostgreSQL in a Docker Compose stack with RBAC,
 - [API Error Format](#api-error-format)
 - [`pg_stat_statements` Requirement](#pg_stat_statements-requirement)
 - [Reverse Proxy / SSL Guidance](#reverse-proxy--ssl-guidance)
+- [Production Proxy Profile](#production-proxy-profile)
 - [PostgreSQL Compatibility Smoke Test](#postgresql-compatibility-smoke-test)
+- [Dependency Exception Flow](#dependency-exception-flow)
+- [Secret Management (Production)](#secret-management-production)
 - [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
 - [Security Notes](#security-notes)
 
@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@ Note: Migrations run automatically when the backend container starts (`entrypoin
 
 | Variable | Description |
 |---|---|
-| `FRONTEND_PORT` | Host port mapped to frontend container port `80` |
+| `FRONTEND_PORT` | Host port mapped to frontend container port `8080` |
 
 ## Core Functional Areas
 
@@ -371,6 +374,21 @@ For production, serve frontend and API under the same public origin via reverse
 
 This prevents mixed-content and CORS issues.
 
+## Production Proxy Profile
+
+A secure, repeatable production profile is included:
+
+- `ops/profiles/prod/.env.production.example`
+- `ops/profiles/prod/nginx/nexapg.conf`
+- `docs/deployment/proxy-production-profile.md`
+
+Highlights:
+
+- explicit CORS recommendations per environment (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`)
+- required reverse-proxy header forwarding for backend context
+- API path forwarding (`/api/` -> backend)
+- mixed-content prevention guidance for HTTPS deployments
+
 ## PostgreSQL Compatibility Smoke Test
 
 Run manually against one DSN:
@@ -387,6 +405,29 @@ PG_DSN_CANDIDATES='postgresql://postgres:postgres@postgres:5432/compatdb?sslmode
 python backend/scripts/pg_compat_smoke.py
 ```
 
+## Dependency Exception Flow
+
+Python dependency vulnerabilities are enforced by CI via `pip-audit`.
+
+- CI blocks unresolved `HIGH` and `CRITICAL` findings.
+- Missing severity metadata is treated conservatively as `HIGH`.
+- Temporary exceptions must be declared in `ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json`.
+- Full process and required metadata are documented in:
+  - `docs/security/dependency-exceptions.md`
+
+## Secret Management (Production)
+
+Secret handling guidance is documented in:
+
+- `docs/security/secret-management.md`
+
+It includes:
+
+- secure handling for `JWT_SECRET_KEY`, `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, `DB_PASSWORD`, and SMTP credentials
+- clear **Do / Don't** rules
+- recommended secret provider patterns (Vault/cloud/orchestrator/CI injection)
+- practical rotation basics and operational checklist
+
 ## Troubleshooting
 
 ### Backend container keeps restarting during `make migrate`
@@ -421,3 +462,5 @@ Set target `sslmode` to `disable` (or correct SSL config on target DB).
 - RBAC enforced on protected endpoints
 - Audit logs for critical actions
 - Collector error logging includes throttling to reduce repeated noise
+- Production secret handling and rotation guidance:
+  - `docs/security/secret-management.md`

backend/app/core/config.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ from functools import lru_cache
 from pydantic import field_validator
 from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
 
-NEXAPG_VERSION = "0.2.2"
+NEXAPG_VERSION = "0.2.4"
 
 
 class Settings(BaseSettings):

backend/scripts/pip_audit_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Gate pip-audit results with an auditable allowlist policy.
+
+Policy:
+- Block unresolved HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerabilities.
+- If severity is missing, treat as HIGH by default.
+- Allow temporary exceptions via allowlist with expiry metadata.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime as dt
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+SEVERITY_ORDER = {"unknown": 0, "low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3, "critical": 4}
+BLOCKING_SEVERITIES = {"high", "critical"}
+
+
+def _parse_date(s: str) -> dt.date:
+    return dt.date.fromisoformat(s)
+
+
+def _normalize_severity(value: object) -> str:
+    """Normalize various pip-audit/osv-style severity payloads."""
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        v = value.strip().lower()
+        if v in SEVERITY_ORDER:
+            return v
+        try:
+            # CVSS numeric string fallback
+            score = float(v)
+            if score >= 9.0:
+                return "critical"
+            if score >= 7.0:
+                return "high"
+            if score >= 4.0:
+                return "medium"
+            return "low"
+        except ValueError:
+            return "unknown"
+
+    if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
+        score = float(value)
+        if score >= 9.0:
+            return "critical"
+        if score >= 7.0:
+            return "high"
+        if score >= 4.0:
+            return "medium"
+        return "low"
+
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        # OSV sometimes returns a list of dicts. Pick the max-known severity.
+        best = "unknown"
+        for item in value:
+            if isinstance(item, dict):
+                sev = _normalize_severity(item.get("severity"))
+                if SEVERITY_ORDER.get(sev, 0) > SEVERITY_ORDER.get(best, 0):
+                    best = sev
+        return best
+
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return _normalize_severity(value.get("severity"))
+
+    return "unknown"
+
+
+def _load_allowlist(path: Path) -> tuple[list[dict], list[str]]:
+    if not path.exists():
+        return [], []
+
+    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    entries = data.get("entries", [])
+    today = dt.date.today()
+    active: list[dict] = []
+    errors: list[str] = []
+
+    required = {"id", "reason", "approved_by", "issue", "expires_on"}
+    for idx, entry in enumerate(entries, start=1):
+        missing = required - set(entry.keys())
+        if missing:
+            errors.append(f"allowlist entry #{idx} missing keys: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}")
+            continue
+        try:
+            expires = _parse_date(str(entry["expires_on"]))
+        except ValueError:
+            errors.append(f"allowlist entry #{idx} has invalid expires_on: {entry['expires_on']}")
+            continue
+
+        if expires < today:
+            errors.append(
+                f"allowlist entry #{idx} ({entry['id']}) expired on {entry['expires_on']}"
+            )
+            continue
+
+        active.append(entry)
+
+    return active, errors
+
+
+def _iter_findings(report: object):
+    # pip-audit JSON can be list[dep] or dict with dependencies.
+    deps = report if isinstance(report, list) else report.get("dependencies", [])
+    for dep in deps:
+        package = dep.get("name", "unknown")
+        version = dep.get("version", "unknown")
+        for vuln in dep.get("vulns", []):
+            vuln_id = vuln.get("id", "unknown")
+            aliases = vuln.get("aliases", []) or []
+            severity = _normalize_severity(vuln.get("severity"))
+            if severity == "unknown":
+                severity = "high"  # conservative default for policy safety
+            yield {
+                "package": package,
+                "version": version,
+                "id": vuln_id,
+                "aliases": aliases,
+                "severity": severity,
+                "fix_versions": vuln.get("fix_versions", []),
+            }
+
+
+def _is_allowlisted(finding: dict, allowlist: list[dict]) -> bool:
+    ids = {finding["id"], *finding["aliases"]}
+    pkg = finding["package"]
+    for entry in allowlist:
+        entry_pkg = entry.get("package")
+        if entry["id"] in ids and (not entry_pkg or entry_pkg == pkg):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--report", required=True, help="Path to pip-audit JSON report")
+    parser.add_argument("--allowlist", required=True, help="Path to allowlist JSON")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    report_path = Path(args.report)
+    allowlist_path = Path(args.allowlist)
+    if not report_path.exists():
+        print(f"[pip-audit-gate] Missing report: {report_path}")
+        return 1
+
+    report = json.loads(report_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    allowlist, allowlist_errors = _load_allowlist(allowlist_path)
+    if allowlist_errors:
+        print("[pip-audit-gate] Allowlist validation failed:")
+        for err in allowlist_errors:
+            print(f"  - {err}")
+        return 1
+
+    unresolved_blocking: list[dict] = []
+    summary = {"critical": 0, "high": 0, "medium": 0, "low": 0, "unknown": 0}
+    ignored = 0
+
+    for finding in _iter_findings(report):
+        sev = finding["severity"]
+        summary[sev] = summary.get(sev, 0) + 1
+        if _is_allowlisted(finding, allowlist):
+            ignored += 1
+            continue
+        if sev in BLOCKING_SEVERITIES:
+            unresolved_blocking.append(finding)
+
+    print("[pip-audit-gate] Summary:")
+    print(
+        f"  CRITICAL={summary['critical']} HIGH={summary['high']} "
+        f"MEDIUM={summary['medium']} LOW={summary['low']} ALLOWLISTED={ignored}"
+    )
+
+    if unresolved_blocking:
+        print("[pip-audit-gate] Blocking vulnerabilities found:")
+        for f in unresolved_blocking:
+            aliases = ", ".join(f["aliases"]) if f["aliases"] else "-"
+            fixes = ", ".join(f["fix_versions"]) if f["fix_versions"] else "-"
+            print(
+                f"  - {f['severity'].upper()} {f['package']}=={f['version']} "
+                f"id={f['id']} aliases=[{aliases}] fixes=[{fixes}]"
+            )
+        return 1
+
+    print("[pip-audit-gate] No unresolved HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerabilities.")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

docs/deployment/proxy-production-profile.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Production Proxy Profile (HTTPS)
+
+This profile defines a secure and repeatable NexaPG deployment behind a reverse proxy.
+
+## Included Profile Files
+
+- `ops/profiles/prod/.env.production.example`
+- `ops/profiles/prod/nginx/nexapg.conf`
+
+## CORS Recommendations by Environment
+
+| Environment | Recommended `CORS_ORIGINS` | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `dev` | `*` or local explicit origins | `*` is acceptable only for local/dev usage. |
+| `staging` | Exact staging UI origins | Example: `https://staging-monitor.example.com` |
+| `prod` | Exact production UI origin(s) only | No wildcard; use comma-separated HTTPS origins if needed. |
+
+Examples:
+
+```env
+# dev only
+CORS_ORIGINS=*
+
+# staging
+CORS_ORIGINS=https://staging-monitor.example.com
+
+# prod
+CORS_ORIGINS=https://monitor.example.com
+```
+
+## Reverse Proxy Requirements
+
+For stable auth, CORS, and request context handling, forward these headers to backend:
+
+- `Host`
+- `X-Real-IP`
+- `X-Forwarded-For`
+- `X-Forwarded-Proto`
+- `X-Forwarded-Host`
+- `X-Forwarded-Port`
+
+Also forward API paths:
+
+- `/api/` -> backend service (`:8000`)
+
+## Mixed-Content Prevention
+
+NexaPG frontend is designed to avoid mixed-content in HTTPS mode:
+
+- Build/runtime default API base is relative (`/api/v1`)
+- `frontend/src/api.js` upgrades `http` API URL to `https` when page runs on HTTPS
+
+Recommended production setting:
+
+```env
+VITE_API_URL=/api/v1
+```
+
+## Validation Checklist
+
+1. Open app over HTTPS and verify:
+   - login request is `https://.../api/v1/auth/login`
+   - no browser mixed-content errors in console
+2. Verify CORS behavior:
+   - allowed origin works
+   - unknown origin is blocked
+3. Verify backend receives forwarded protocol:
+   - proxied responses succeed with no redirect/proto issues
+
+## CI Validation
+
+`Proxy Profile Validation` workflow runs static guardrail checks:
+
+- relative `VITE_API_URL` default
+- required API proxy path in frontend NGINX config
+- required forwarded headers
+- HTTPS mixed-content guard in frontend API resolver
+- production profile forbids wildcard CORS

docs/security/dependency-exceptions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Dependency Security Exception Flow (pip-audit)
+
+This document defines the auditable exception process for Python dependency vulnerabilities.
+
+## Policy
+
+- CI blocks unresolved `HIGH` and `CRITICAL` dependency vulnerabilities.
+- If a vulnerability does not provide severity metadata, it is treated as `HIGH` by policy.
+- Temporary exceptions are allowed only through `ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json`.
+
+## Allowlist Location
+
+- File: `ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json`
+- Format:
+
+```json
+{
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "id": "CVE-2026-12345",
+      "package": "example-package",
+      "reason": "Upstream fix not released yet",
+      "approved_by": "security-owner",
+      "issue": "NX-202",
+      "expires_on": "2026-12-31"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+## Required Fields
+
+- `id`: Vulnerability ID (`CVE-*`, `GHSA-*`, or advisory ID)
+- `reason`: Why exception is necessary
+- `approved_by`: Approver identity
+- `issue`: Tracking issue/ticket
+- `expires_on`: Expiry date in `YYYY-MM-DD`
+
+Optional:
+
+- `package`: Restrict exception to one dependency package
+
+## Rules
+
+- Expired allowlist entries fail CI.
+- Missing required fields fail CI.
+- Exceptions must be time-limited and linked to a tracking issue.
+- Removing an exception is required once an upstream fix is available.
+
+## Auditability
+
+- Every exception change is tracked in Git history and code review.
+- CI logs include blocked vulnerabilities and allowlisted findings counts.

docs/security/secret-management.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# Secret Management (Production)
+
+This guide defines secure handling for NexaPG secrets in production deployments.
+
+## In Scope Secrets
+
+- `JWT_SECRET_KEY`
+- `ENCRYPTION_KEY`
+- `DB_PASSWORD`
+- SMTP credentials (configured in Admin Settings, encrypted at rest)
+
+## Do / Don't
+
+## Do
+
+- Use an external secret source (Vault, cloud secret manager, orchestrator secrets, or CI/CD secret injection).
+- Keep secrets out of Git history and out of image layers.
+- Use strong random values:
+  - JWT secret: at least 32+ bytes random
+  - Fernet key: generated via `Fernet.generate_key()`
+- Restrict access to runtime secrets (least privilege).
+- Rotate secrets on schedule and on incident.
+- Store production `.env` with strict permissions if file-based injection is used:
+  - owner-only read/write (e.g., `chmod 600 .env`)
+- Audit who can read/update secrets in your deployment platform.
+
+## Don't
+
+- Do **not** hardcode secrets in source code.
+- Do **not** commit `.env` with real values.
+- Do **not** bake production secrets into Dockerfiles or image build args.
+- Do **not** share secrets in tickets, chat logs, or CI console output.
+- Do **not** reuse the same secrets between environments.
+
+## Recommended Secret Providers
+
+Pick one of these models:
+
+1. Platform/Cloud secrets
+   - AWS Secrets Manager
+   - Azure Key Vault
+   - Google Secret Manager
+2. HashiCorp Vault
+3. CI/CD secret injection
+   - Inject as runtime env vars during deployment
+4. Docker/Kubernetes secrets
+   - Prefer secret mounts or orchestrator-native secret stores
+
+If you use plain `.env` files, treat them as sensitive artifacts and protect at OS and backup level.
+
+## Rotation Basics
+
+Minimum baseline:
+
+1. `JWT_SECRET_KEY`
+   - Rotate on schedule (e.g., quarterly) and immediately after compromise.
+   - Expect existing sessions/tokens to become invalid after rotation.
+2. `ENCRYPTION_KEY`
+   - Rotate with planned maintenance.
+   - Re-encrypt stored encrypted values (target passwords, SMTP password) during key transition.
+3. `DB_PASSWORD`
+   - Rotate service account credentials regularly.
+   - Apply password changes in DB and deployment config atomically.
+4. SMTP credentials
+   - Use dedicated sender account/app password.
+   - Rotate regularly and after provider-side security alerts.
+
+## Operational Checklist
+
+- [ ] No production secret in repository files.
+- [ ] No production secret in container image metadata or build args.
+- [ ] Runtime secret source documented for your environment.
+- [ ] Secret rotation owner and schedule defined.
+- [ ] Incident runbook includes emergency rotation steps.

frontend/Dockerfile

@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ RUN npm run build
 FROM nginx:1-alpine-slim
 RUN apk upgrade --no-cache \
     && mkdir -p /var/cache/nginx /var/run /var/log/nginx /tmp/nginx \
-    && chown -R nginx:nginx /var/cache/nginx /var/run /var/log/nginx /tmp/nginx
+    && chown -R nginx:nginx /var/cache/nginx /var/run /var/log/nginx /tmp/nginx \
+    && sed -i 's#pid[[:space:]]\+/run/nginx.pid;#pid /tmp/nginx/nginx.pid;#' /etc/nginx/nginx.conf \
+    && sed -i 's#pid[[:space:]]\+/var/run/nginx.pid;#pid /tmp/nginx/nginx.pid;#' /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
 COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
 COPY --from=build /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html
 USER 101

ops/.env.example

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ LOG_LEVEL=INFO
 # Core Database (internal metadata DB)
 # ------------------------------
 # Database that stores users, targets, metrics, query stats, and audit logs.
+# DEV default only. Use strong unique credentials in production.
 DB_NAME=nexapg
 DB_USER=nexapg
 DB_PASSWORD=nexapg
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ DB_PORT=5433
 # ------------------------------
 # Host port mapped to backend container port 8000.
 BACKEND_PORT=8000
-# JWT signing secret. Change this in every non-local environment.
+# JWT signing secret. Never hardcode in source. Rotate regularly.
 JWT_SECRET_KEY=change_this_super_secret
 JWT_ALGORITHM=HS256
 # Access token lifetime in minutes.
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_MINUTES=15
 # Refresh token lifetime in minutes (10080 = 7 days).
 JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_MINUTES=10080
 # Key used to encrypt monitored target passwords at rest.
+# Never hardcode in source. Rotate with re-encryption plan.
 # Generate with:
 # python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
 ENCRYPTION_KEY=REPLACE_WITH_FERNET_KEY
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ INIT_ADMIN_PASSWORD=ChangeMe123!
 # ------------------------------
 # Frontend
 # ------------------------------
-# Host port mapped to frontend container port 80.
+# Host port mapped to frontend container port 8080.
 FRONTEND_PORT=5173
 # Base API URL used at frontend build time.
 # For reverse proxy + SSL, keep this relative to avoid mixed-content issues.

ops/profiles/prod/.env.production.example

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# NexaPG production profile (reverse proxy + HTTPS)
+# Copy to .env and adjust values for your environment.
+
+# ------------------------------
+# Application
+# ------------------------------
+APP_NAME=NexaPG Monitor
+ENVIRONMENT=prod
+LOG_LEVEL=INFO
+
+# ------------------------------
+# Core Database
+# ------------------------------
+DB_NAME=nexapg
+DB_USER=nexapg
+DB_PASSWORD=change_me
+DB_PORT=5433
+
+# ------------------------------
+# Backend
+# ------------------------------
+BACKEND_PORT=8000
+JWT_SECRET_KEY=replace_with_long_random_secret
+JWT_ALGORITHM=HS256
+JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_MINUTES=15
+JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_MINUTES=10080
+ENCRYPTION_KEY=REPLACE_WITH_FERNET_KEY
+
+# Production CORS:
+# - no wildcard
+# - set exact public UI origin(s)
+CORS_ORIGINS=https://monitor.example.com
+
+POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS=30
+ALERT_ACTIVE_CONNECTION_RATIO_MIN_TOTAL_CONNECTIONS=5
+ALERT_ROLLBACK_RATIO_WINDOW_MINUTES=15
+ALERT_ROLLBACK_RATIO_MIN_TOTAL_TRANSACTIONS=100
+ALERT_ROLLBACK_RATIO_MIN_ROLLBACKS=10
+
+INIT_ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@example.com
+INIT_ADMIN_PASSWORD=ChangeMe123!
+
+# ------------------------------
+# Frontend
+# ------------------------------
+# Keep frontend API base relative to avoid HTTPS mixed-content.
+FRONTEND_PORT=5173
+VITE_API_URL=/api/v1

ops/profiles/prod/nginx/nexapg.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# NGINX reverse proxy profile for NexaPG (HTTPS).
+# Replace monitor.example.com and certificate paths.
+
+server {
+    listen 80;
+    server_name monitor.example.com;
+    return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
+}
+
+server {
+    listen 443 ssl http2;
+    server_name monitor.example.com;
+
+    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/monitor.example.com/fullchain.pem;
+    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/monitor.example.com/privkey.pem;
+    ssl_session_timeout 1d;
+    ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m;
+    ssl_session_tickets off;
+
+    # Baseline security headers
+    add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+    add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
+    add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
+    add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
+
+    # Frontend app
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5173;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Port $server_port;
+    }
+
+    # API forwarding to backend
+    location /api/ {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8000;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Port $server_port;
+    }
+}

ops/scripts/validate_proxy_profile.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+echo "[proxy-profile] validating reverse-proxy and mixed-content guardrails"
+
+require_pattern() {
+  local file="$1"
+  local pattern="$2"
+  local message="$3"
+  if ! grep -Eq "$pattern" "$file"; then
+    echo "[proxy-profile] FAIL: $message ($file)"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+# Frontend should default to relative API base in container builds.
+require_pattern "frontend/Dockerfile" "ARG VITE_API_URL=/api/v1" \
+  "VITE_API_URL default must be relative (/api/v1)"
+
+# Frontend runtime proxy should forward /api with forward headers.
+require_pattern "frontend/nginx.conf" "location /api/" \
+  "frontend nginx must proxy /api/"
+require_pattern "frontend/nginx.conf" "proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto" \
+  "frontend nginx must set X-Forwarded-Proto"
+require_pattern "frontend/nginx.conf" "proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For" \
+  "frontend nginx must set X-Forwarded-For"
+require_pattern "frontend/nginx.conf" "proxy_set_header Host" \
+  "frontend nginx must forward Host"
+
+# Mixed-content guard in frontend API client.
+require_pattern "frontend/src/api.js" "window\\.location\\.protocol === \"https:\".*parsed\\.protocol === \"http:\"" \
+  "frontend api client must contain HTTPS mixed-content protection"
+
+# Production profile must not use wildcard CORS.
+require_pattern "ops/profiles/prod/.env.production.example" "^CORS_ORIGINS=https://[^*]+$" \
+  "production profile must use explicit HTTPS CORS origins"
+
+echo "[proxy-profile] PASS"

ops/security/pip-audit-allowlist.json

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{
+  "entries": []
+}